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MORAL DUTIES AND DIVINE COMMANDS:
IS KANTIAN RELIGION COHERENT?
Micah Lott

Kant argues that morality leads to religion, and that religion consists in regarding our moral duties as divine commands. This paper explores a foundational
question for Kantian religion: When you think of your duties as divine commands, what exactly are you thinking, and how is that thought consistent
with Kant’s own account of the ways that morality is independent from God?
I argue that if we assume the Kantian religious person acts out of obedience to
God, then her overall outlook will be inconsistent. I then develop an account
of regarding duties as divine commands that does not involve acting out of
obedience to God. This account, however, faces an objection—that without
obedience, one cannot actually be thinking of duties as divine commands. In
the final section, I consider this objection and suggest a response.

1. Duty, Divine Commands, and Kantian Religion
Immanuel Kant holds two positions that appear to stand in tension with one
another, if not outright contradiction. On the one hand, Kant claims that morality leads to religion, and that religion consists in regarding God as the moral
lawgiver and our moral duties as divine commands. On the other hand, Kant
insists that we do not need any thought about God in order to recognize our
moral duties or to be motivated to act morally—and he appears to reject a divine
command theory of morality, on the grounds that it is based in heteronomy
and offers a material, rather than formal, principle of morality.1 Here are some
examples of Kant making the first point, about duties as divine commands:
Morality thus inevitably leads to religion, and through religion it extends
itself to the idea of a mighty moral lawgiver outside the human being, in
whose will the ultimate end (of the creation of the world) is what can and at
the same time ought to be the ultimate human end.2
1
See Groundwork 4:441–445, esp. 4:443, and Critique of Practical Reason, 5:39–41. For an
argument that the Groundwork passage is directed specifically at the position of Crucius, and
not all divine command theories, see Hare, God and Morality, 152–155. In Critique of Practical
Reason, Kant cites Crucius as a proponent of the view he is rejecting. The translations of
Kant’s texts used here are listed in the References.
2
Kant, Religion, 6:6.
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Hence an ethical community is conceivable only as a people under divine commands, i.e. as a people of God, and indeed in accordance with the laws of virtue.3
[A]ll religion consists in this, that in all our duties we look upon [ansehen]
God as the lawgiver to be honored universally.4

Here are some examples of Kant making the second point, about the independence of morality from God:
Hence the will is not merely subject to the law but subject to it in such a way
that it must be viewed as also giving the law to itself and just because of this
as first subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author).5
Pure reason is practical of itself alone and gives (to the human being) a universal law which we call the moral law.6
Moreover, it is not to be understood by this that it is necessary to assume the
existence of God as a ground of all obligation in general (for this rests, as has
been sufficiently shown, solely on the autonomy of reason itself).7
So far as morality is based on the conception of the human being as one who
is free but who also, just because of that, binds himself through his reason to
unconditional laws, it is in need neither of the idea of another being above
him in order that he recognize his duty, nor, that he observe it, of an incentive
other than the law itself . . . Hence on its own behalf morality in no way needs
religion (whether objectively, as regards willing, or subjectively, as regards
capability) but is rather self-sufficient by virtue of pure practical reason.8

Looking at these passages together, a reader might reasonably wonder:
what gives? If morality is grounded in the autonomy of reason, and if we
have no need of God to recognize our moral duties and observe them, and
if we don’t lose sight of these points about morality, then what are we supposed to be doing when we regard our moral duties as divine commands
given by God the mighty moral lawgiver? This question is closely related
to, but distinct from, the question of why Kant thinks we must regard our
duties as divine commands—i.e., why Kant believes that morality leads to
religion. In this paper, I will touch on the why question, but my focus will
be on the more basic what question. Put simply: when one thinks of one’s
moral duties as divine commands, what exactly is one thinking—and how
is that thought consistent with Kant’s own account of morality’s independence from God?9 Because conceiving of duties as divine commands

Kant, Religion, 6:99.
Kant, Religion, 6:103–104.
5
Kant, Groundwork, 4:431.
6
Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:31.
7
Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:125.
8
Kant, Religion, 6:3.
9
Of course, the best way to figure out the nature and content of this thought might be to
consider why Kant believes we must regard our duties this way. Even so, it is worth keeping
in mind that these are distinct issues. Works that focus on the why question include: Hare,
“Kant on Recognizing Our Duties”; Wood, “Religion, Ethical Community, and Evil”; Kain,
“Interpreting Kant’s Theory of Divine Commands.”
3
4

MORAL DUTIES AND DIVINE COMMANDS

59

is at the heart of Kant’s rational religion, this question is asking about the
central and defining attitude of the Kantian religious person.10
We might assume that fulfilling duties that we regard as divine commands is the same as obeying God. Call this the Obedience Assumption.
The Obedience Assumption is natural and prima facie reasonable, both on
conceptual and textual grounds. If you take yourself to have been commanded to do something, and you do it for that reason, that sure looks like
obedience. And Kant speaks often about obedience to commands, declaring at one point that “commands are laws that must be obeyed.”11 Thus to
think of duties as divine commands seems to be the same as thinking them
as laws given by God that must be obeyed. And to fulfill one’s duties from
such a thought seems to be the same as obeying God. It is no surprise, then,
that John Hare describes the Kantian religious person as acting “out of
obedience to God.”12
But given the Obedience Assumption, it becomes difficult to see how
the Kantian religious person could occupy a coherent point of view. In
the next section, I consider some features of obedience to commands in
ordinary human contexts. I argue that the more we think about what is
involved in obeying commands, the harder it becomes to see how one
could recognize moral duties as divine commands while also maintaining Kant’s claims about morality’s independence from God.13 In §3, I consider the interpretations of Kantian religion offered by Allen Wood and
John Hare, respectively. I argue that so long as we retain the Obedience
Assumption, neither interpretation can make the Kantian religious outlook consistent.14 In §4, I offer an account of regarding duties as divine
commands in which the Kantian religious person does not act out of obedience to divine commands (or, equivalently, out of obedience to God).
This account of the Kantian religious attitude avoids the problems that
10
By “Kantian religious person” I do not mean any religious person who might also be
described as a “Kantian” in some meaningful sense. I mean an adherent of Kantian rational
religion as laid out by Kant, especially in Religion.
11
Kant, Groundwork, 4:416.
12
Hare, “Kant on Recognizing Our Duties,” 469.
13
A.T. Nuyen notes a tension in Kant’s statements, some of which sound like those of a
“Divine Command Theorist” and others those of a “Moral Autonomy Theorist.” And Nuyen
attempts to show how Kant’s statements are consistent. But he does not bring into view
the problem that interests me here, about how to conceive of the attitude of the Kantian
religious person, and in particular the way (if any) that the Kantian religious person can
be said to fulfill her moral duties from obedience to God. See Nuyen, “Is Kant a Divine
Command Theorist?” Likewise, the problem for Kant’s view that I raise here is not discussed
by Firestone and Jacobs in their extended treatment of challenges to Kant’s Religion. See
Firestone and Jacobs, In Defense.
14
Hare clearly affirms what I am calling the Obedience Assumption. See Hare, “Kant on
Recognizing Our Duties,” 469; Hare, “Kant’s Divine Command Theory,” 272–274. It is less
clear that Wood affirms the Obedience Assumption, but there are strong suggestions that he
does, at least in some places. See Wood, “Religion, Ethical Community, and Evil,” 501–502,
507–508. In any case, my goal is not to attack these two interpreters, but to explore the issues
that arise once we assume that the person who fulfills duties regarded as divine commands
acts out of obedience to God.
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arise from obedience, but it faces a difficulty of its own—that without
obedience to God, the Kantian religious person is not actually thinking of
moral duties as divine commands. In the final section, I consider this objection and suggest a possible response.
2. Commands, Obedience, and Morality
Kant says that morality leads through the concept of the highest good
to religion, which is “the recognition [Erkenntis] of all duties as divine commands.” Moral duties must “be regarded [angesehen werden] as commands of the Supreme being.”15 Our question is what this recognition
involves, what regarding moral duties this way consists in. It seems
reasonable to start with the attitude of obedience to commands, and
to consider ordinary instances of obedience. After all, commands are
a familiar feature of human life—e.g., a sergeant commands a private
to dig a ditch, a parent orders her child to clean his room. Why not
suppose that regarding duties as divine commands, and fulfilling them
as such, can be understood along the same lines as the attitude of the
private who obeys his sergeant or the child who obeys his parent? That
is what I am calling the Obedience Assumption. The problem with
this approach is that our ordinary notion of obedience to commands
appears to be incompatible with Kant’s claims about the independence
of morality from God.
To see the problem, consider a simple case: A sergeant orders a private to dig a ditch, and the private obeys by digging a ditch. If we ask
the obedient private why he dug the ditch, then he can reply, “Because
my commanding officer ordered me to dig it.” In a different scenario,
the private might have heard the command, but then dug the ditch simply because he thought it was a good idea. Or he might have dug the
ditch “because” the sergeant ordered him to do it, but only in the sense
that the sergeant’s order alerted him to the fact that the ditch needed
digging—e.g., without it, there would be a flood in the camp. But in
those cases, the private will not have obeyed the sergeant’s command,
even though he will have done the thing he was commanded to do. To
obey a command, I must act as commanded because I have been commanded. As Robert Paul Wolff says: “Obedience is not a matter of doing
what someone tells you to do. It is a matter of doing what he tells you to
do because he tells you to do it.”16
When I obey a command, the fact of the command is essential to my reason for acting. And in acting because I have been commanded, I acknowledge the commander’s practical authority over me—i.e., her right to be
obeyed, and her capacity to give me decisive reason to do (certain) things
by ordering me to do them. An act of commanding presupposes such
authority as the ground of the command’s normative significance for the
15
16

Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:129.
Quoted in Green, “Legal Obligation and Authority,” § 2.
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recipient of the command.17 Hence if a fellow private, rather than a sergeant, starts ordering me to dig ditches, I can reject his “commands” as
presuming an authority that he in fact lacks. Colloquially put: You’re not
the boss of me.
Suppose, then, that we apply this familiar sort of obedience to commands to the case of regarding our moral duties as divine commands. In
ordinary cases, obeying a command means being in a position to explain
why you did something by saying something like: “Because she told me
to, and she’s the boss.” Thus if we ask the Kantian religious person (who
regards moral duties as divine commands) why she fulfills some duty, e.g.
keeping her promises, she will be able to say: “Because God told me to,
and God is the boss.” Likewise, in ordinary cases of obedience one takes
the command to have a normative significance that is grounded in the
commander’s practical authority. Understood along these lines, the person who regards moral duties as divine commands must think of moral
duties as having a normative significance that is based in God’s practical
authority.
The problem, however, is that this way of thinking about one’s moral
duties conflicts with Kant’s claims about the independence of morality
from God. First, it conflicts with Kant’s claim that, in morality, a person does not need “the idea of another being above him in order that he
recognize his duty.”18 For in ordinary cases of recognizing and obeying
a command, the idea of another being above you is precisely what you
need to have in mind—“above” in the sense of having practical authority
over you. Second, it conflicts with Kant’s claim that we are not required
17
Mark Murphy denies this: “But sincere commanding requires not belief in one’s authority but, at most, belief that one possesses some superiority relevant to the modification of reasons for action through the speech-act. A bully can, without possessing practical authority,
give commands, in part because he or she has, through physical strength or other means of
making other’s lives unpleasant, the capacity to modify the reasons for action others have by
his or her commands. The commander does not as such imply that he or she is an authority
over the commanded” (An Essay on Divine Authority, 28).
I like Murphy’s example, but I think it supports the opposite conclusion from the one that
he draws. Consider what we would naturally say to a bully who is bossing people around:
“Who do you think you are to tell people what to do? Who made you king? You’re not the
boss around here. Stop telling people what to do!” Such a response highlights the fact that
the bully’s acts of commanding indeed presuppose practical authority. In giving commands,
the bully is acting as if he had authority. And in rejecting him as a mere bully, rather than a
genuine authority, we are saying that his presumption of authority is false—that, in fact, he
has no right to order us around. Of course, we might nevertheless comply with the bully’s
demands for prudential reasons, especially if he has the power to make our lives miserable.
But in dealing with a bully this way, we are not really obeying his commands as commands.
In any case, what is really crucial to my argument is not that sincere commanding presupposes practical authority. What matters is that there is a central type of obedience that
involves recognizing the practical authority of another person. That is the sort of obedience
that is relevant here, since Kant clearly does not think that God is a bully. And whatever recognizing duties as divine commands involves, it cannot be like our “obedience” to a bully,
where we comply for merely prudential reasons.
18
Kant, Religion, 6:3.
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to “assume the existence of God as a ground of all obligation in general (for
this rests, as has been sufficiently shown, solely on the autonomy of reason
itself).”19 For if God is not the ground of obligation, and if the ground of
obligation is rather the autonomy of reason, then how can it be correct to
regard our moral duties as having a normative significance that is based
in God’s practical authority over us—i.e. to fulfill them in an attitude of
obedience to divine commands? And third, if pure practical reason “gives
(to the human being) a universal law which we call the moral law,” then it
looks like a mistake to obey the moral law out of obedience to God conceived as the mighty moral lawgiver.20 If anyone is the boss here, it would
seem to be pure practical reason, not God.
Might we resolve these worries if we suppose that the Kantian religious person thinks of moral obligation as grounded both in pure practical
reason and in God’s practical authority? After all, there is nothing strange
about a private who thinks both (a) that digging the ditch is a good idea,
because it will prevent a flood in the camp, and (b) that he has decisive
reason to dig the ditch anyway, because his sergeant has ordered him to
do so. Might not the outlook of the Kantian religious person have a similar structure? Her reasons to fulfill her moral duties would be overdetermined, and she would understand them as such.
I will return to this suggestion in §4 below. But for now, what matters
is that it does not solve the difficulties raised by the idea of obedience
to divine commands. There is indeed nothing strange about the outlook
of the private who digs a ditch out of obedience, while also recognizing
that digging the ditch is simply a good idea. But the issue here is what is
internal to his motivation insofar as he acts from obedience. And insofar as
he acts from obedience, there is an importance sense in which the action’s
being a good idea is neither here nor there. Qua someone who acts from
obedience, he does not dig the ditch because it will prevent a flood, but
because he has been commanded to do so. This is brought out by the fact it
can make sense for a private to dig a ditch out of obedience even if he has
no understanding of why it is a good idea, or even if he believes (perhaps
correctly) that it is a bad idea.
In the case of Kantian religion, the parallel with the soldier would be
someone who thinks both (a) that morality is independent of God in all
the ways that Kant insists, and (b) that she has reason to fulfill her moral
duties because God has commanded her to do so. The problems emerge
when we think about what is internal to her motivation insofar as she acts
from obedience. For if the Kantian religious person is like the obedient
private, then there is an important sense in which further considerations
are neither here nor there: qua someone who acts out of obedience to God,
she does not fulfill his moral duties for any reason other than because God
commands her to. And that looks like a mistake, given Kant’s own account
of morality’s independence from God. Obedience at best fails to bring into
19
20

Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:125.
Kant, Groundwork, 4:431.
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view, and at worse it seriously misrepresents, the idea that moral obligations are grounded in our nature as free beings and in self-legislation.
Nor does obedience fit with the claim that the person who acts dutifully
“is in need neither of the idea of another being above him in order that he
recognize his duty, nor, that he observe it, of an incentive other than the
law itself.”21
So it looks like obedience—or at least obedience in the familiar sense—
cannot be the right way to understand what it means to regard our
moral duties as divine commands. This suggests that, for Kant, regarding our duties as divine commands is not the same as obeying divine
commands—i.e., that we should jettison the Obedience Assumption.
I explore this idea in §4 below. First, however, I will consider two interpretations of Kantian religion. My goal in considering these two interpretations is to show that if we assume that regarding duties as divine
commands is the same as obedience to God, then Kant’s overall position
remains inconsistent on either interpretation.
3. Two Recent Interpretations of Kant and Divine Commands
3.1. Wood: Duties, Divine Commands, and Ethical Community
Allen Wood sums up Kantian religion this way: “To be religious, for Kant,
is to view all one’s duties as commands issued to one by God.”22 At the
same time, Wood says, Kant holds that morality is independent from
divine commands in at least four ways: (1) God’s will is not the ground
of moral obligation. (2) God’s commands do not provide the motivation
for fulfilling our moral duties. (3) God’s commands do not determine the
content of our moral duties. (4) We do not acquire knowledge of our moral
duties from special divine revelation.23
In discussing duties and divine commands, Wood’s primary focus is on
what I earlier called the why question: If morality is independent of God in
these ways, why should moral agents consider their duties as divine commands?24 The best answer, Wood argues, lies in Kant’s idea of ethical community. Morality requires that we pursue the highest good, happiness in
proportion to virtue. Because of the social sources of evil in human beings,
the pursuit of the highest good must be a collective pursuit—a union of
individuals working toward the same end—and thus morality requires
that we join with others in an ethical community.25 In this community, the
Kant, Religion, 6:3.
Wood, “Religion, Ethical Community, and Evil,” 498.
23
Wood, “Religion, Ethical Community, and Evil,” 500.
24
This is true in both Wood, “Rational Theology, Moral Faith, and Religion,” and Wood,
“Religion, Ethical Community, and Evil.”
25
As Kant says: “The highest good cannot be achieved merely by the exertion of the single
individual toward his own moral perfection, but instead requires a union of such individuals
into a whole working toward the same end - a system of well-disposed human beings, in
which and through whose unity alone the highest moral good can come to pass” (Religion
6:97–98).
21
22

64

Faith and Philosophy

moral law is a universally valid public law, recognized by all. The members
of this community must regard themselves as bound by the commands of
a common lawgiver. But unlike the members of a juridical community,
the members of an ethical community cannot regard themselves as the
lawgiver. For they cannot know each other’s innermost motivations, and
the laws of an ethical community apply to innermost motivation, not mere
outer compliance. Thus the lawgiver of an ethical community must be
conceived as someone who “knows the heart” of the people. Because only
God knows the heart, only God is fit to be conceived as the lawgiver of an
ethical community.26 As Kant says:
There must therefore be someone other than the people whom we can
declare the public lawgiver of an ethical community. But neither can ethical
laws be thought of as proceeding originally [ursprünglich ausgehend] merely
from the will of this superior (as statutes [Statute] that would not be binding without his prior sanction [Befehl]) for then they would not be ethical
laws, and the duty commensurate to them would not be free virtue but an
enforceable legal duty. Therefore only such a one can be thought of as the
supreme lawgiver of an ethical community, with respect to whom all true
duties, hence also the ethical, must be represented as at the same time his
commands; consequently, he must also be one who knows the heart in order
to penetrate to the most intimate parts of the dispositions of each and everyone and, as must be in every community, give to each according to the worth
of his actions. But this is the concept of God as a moral ruler of the world.
Hence an ethical community is conceivable only as a people under divine
commands, i.e. as a people of God, and indeed in accordance with the laws
of virtue.27

Wood claims that this notion of God as supreme lawgiver is consistent
with Kant’s claims about morality’s independence from God. The key,
according to Wood, is that “Kant distinguishes the legislator of the law, the
one who issues a command and may attach sanctions to it, from the law’s
author, the one whose will imposes the obligation to obey it.”28 We are to
regard God as the legislator, or lawgiver, of the moral law. This means
supposing that God commands the law and attaches sanctions to it. (To
speak about attaching sanctions here is, I take it, a way of describing God’s
role in guaranteeing that happiness is proportional to virtue within the
highest good.) But we are not to regard God as the author of the moral law.
Rather, “only the idea of the rational will of every rational being as such
26
For a challenge to Wood’s claim that the community is essential for explaining
Kant’s invocation of divine commands, see Kain, “Interpreting Kant’s Theory of Divine
Commands,” 139: “Why think that a divine intention to judge and reward or punish the
behavior of everyone in a community would constitute a command, while a divine intention to reward or punish a solitary individual would fail to constitute a command (as Wood
seems to imply)? . . . What is essential to the notion of command on Kant’s account is that a
will promulgates a rule with an eye toward judicial and executive determinations of reward
and punishment, whether for one or many.”
27
Kant, Religion, 6:99.
28
Wood, “Religion, Ethical Community, and Evil,” 507.
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can be conceived as its author.”29 And thus, Wood claims, we can consistently think of God as the moral lawgiver while maintaining that morality
is independent from God in the four ways noted above. For regarding God
as lawgiver, and our moral duties as divine commands, does not require
appealing to God’s will in order to explain: (a) the ground of moral obligation, or (b) moral motivation, or (c) the content of our moral duties, or
(d) our knowledge of our moral duties.
However, there are two issues with Wood’s appeal to Kant’s distinction between the legislator of the law and the author of the law. The
first issue is a lack of textual support. Wood interprets Kant as holding
that the author of the law, but not the legislator, is the one whose will
imposes the obligation to obey it. But that does not seem to fit with
Kant’s texts. In his lectures on ethics from the late 1770s, Kant says
that a legislator, even when he is not the author of the laws, is able to
impose the obligation of acting in accordance with them.30 And in the
Metaphysics of Morals, Kant says that the legislator, even when he is not
the author of the laws, is “the author (autor) of the obligation in accordance with the law.”31
The second issue concerns the Obedience Assumption and the difficulties we considered in the last section. So long as we maintain that
the proper response to a divine command is obedience, then even if
we grant Wood’s interpretation of Kant’s distinction between legislator and author, that distinction is not sufficient to make Kant’s view
consistent. As noted above, obedience to a command as a command
requires that one takes the fact of being commanded to give one decisive reason to act as commanded, and that one regards that reason as
grounded in the practical authority of the commander.32 Thus if one
thinks of moral duties as the commands of God, and if one obeys them
as such, then one must regard the authority of those commands—their
bindingness—as grounded in God’s authority. But how is that different from thinking of God as the one whose will imposes the obligation to obey the law, which is an idea that Wood rejects? The attitude
of obedience to a superior’s command seems incompatible with the
conception of a superior (in this case, the legislator) as one who issues
commands but whose will does not impose an obligation to obey. So
if we assume that regarding duties as divine commands is a matter of
obedience to God, then the attitude of the Kantian religious person will
not be appropriate to what God really is—namely, a (mere) legislator
whose will does not impose an obligation to obey. Given the Obedience
Assumption, the outlook of the Kantian religious person, as conceived
by Wood, remains inconsistent.
Wood, “Religion, Ethical Community, and Evil,” 507.
Kant, Lectures on Ethics. See the section “Of the Lawgiver,” 76–77.
31
Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 6:227.
32
Of course, the practical authority of the commander need not be ultimate. That authority might itself be grounded in something else.
29
30
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3.2. Hare: Asymmetrical Joint Authorship of the Obligation to Obey
John Hare offers a different interpretation of Kant’s claims about moral
duties and divine commands. Whereas Wood holds that God does not in
any way impose the obligation to obey the moral law, Hare argues that
God does impose the obligation, although God does so together with us.
Hare claims that by the time Kant wrote the Groundwork he was operating
with a distinction between two kinds of author: “There is the author of the
law and there is the author of the obligation in accordance with the law. Put
carefully, it turns out that God and we can be jointly seen as authors in one
sense, namely authors of the obligation of the law, and neither God nor we
can be seen as authors of the law directly.”33 Moreover, even though we are
with God jointly authors of the obligation of the law, this joint authorship
is not symmetrical. The moral law applies to us as rational beings who are
members of the kingdom of ends. God also belongs to this kingdom, but
not as a member. Rather God is the head of the kingdom. Thus, according
to Hare, there is an asymmetry in our joint authorship of the obligation of
the law: “We ordinary moral agents have to see our role as recapitulating
in our own wills the declaration in God’s will of our duties. This is how
we are lawgivers; we declare a correspondence of our wills with the law
(which we do not create). For me to will the law autonomously is to make
it my law.”34
Hare fleshes out this picture by comparing it to examples of ordinary
authority. One example is a student who takes a logic course because doing
so is required by his department.35 Another example is a citizen who pays
her taxes because doing so is required by the law. Both of these, Hare says,
are instances of autonomous submission. Each person acts autonomously as
a student or as a citizen precisely by willingly submitting to an obligation.
And the same thing can be said of our moral duties conceived as divine commands: “To extend this analysis to the context of divine command theory,
we could say that an agent acts autonomously out of her practical identity
as a citizen of God’s kingdom only if she acts out of obedience to God.”36
In every case, the agent’s obedience is autonomous because the agent and
the authority have a shared end, and “there is nothing heteronomous about
willing to obey a superior’s prescription because the superior has prescribed
it, as long as the final end is shared between us.”37 With respect to morality, that shared end is the highest good, in which morality is proportioned
to happiness: “The point of morality is to further one’s own perfection and
the happiness of others. The kingdom of ends is the place where these two
goals coincide.”38 Thus, according to Hare, to regard moral duties as divine
Hare, “Kant on Recognizing our Duties,” 462.
Hare, “Kant on Recognizing our Duties,” 462. See also Hare, God’s Call, 92–97.
35
Hare, “Kant on Recognizing Our Duties,” 468–471, and Hare, “Kant’s Divine Command
Theory,” 267–272. The example of the student is borrowed from Christine Korsgaard.
36
Hare, “Kant on Recognizing our Duties,” 469.
37
Hare, “Kant on Recognizing our Duties,” 471.
38
Hare, “Kant on Recognizing our Duties,” 467.
33
34
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commands is to think of them as duties that pertain to one as a citizen of
the kingdom of ends, in which God is the head who has “combined in one
person the legislative, executive and judicial functions which Kant thinks
should be separated in a well-run earthly republic.”39
Hare disagrees with Wood about the relationship between moral obligation and the divine will. But Hare’s interpretation also faces difficulties,
again arising from the notion of obedience. The basic problem is this: If
the Kantian religious person acts from obedience to God, and we construe
divine commands as similar to authoritative prescriptions like departmental rules or civil laws, then its hard to see how the attitude of the
Kantian religious person is consistent with Kant’s claims about the independence of morality from God. Hare is concerned to show that submission to divine commands need not be heteronomous—that there is such
a thing as autonomous submission to authority. Let us grant that. Even so,
fulfilling one’s moral duties as an act of autonomous obedience to God
still requires one to act from some thought about God as an authority who
issues commands. And that seems to conflict with Kant’s claim in the preface to Religion: “So far as morality is based on the conception of the human
being as one who is free but who also, just because of that, binds himself
through his reason to unconditional laws, it is in need neither of the idea
of another being above him in order that he recognize his duty, nor, that
he observe it, of an incentive other than the law itself.”40 In cases like the
student or the citizen, their autonomous submission does need the idea of
another being above them—i.e., whoever has established the departmental policies, in the one case, or the tax laws, in the other.
Hare has a reply to this worry. According to Hare, the preface to Religion
assumes a distinction between what human beings are qua free beings and
what human beings are qua dependent beings or “creatures of need.” On
this interpretation, Kant’s point is that so far as we are free, we have no need
of a being over us, and in that way morality on its own behalf does not need
religion. However, we are also dependent beings, and “our morality needs
religion because of the sort of beings we are . . . We belong to two worlds
(sensible and insensible) and, as such, we do need the idea of a being over
us, and of an incentive other than morality.”41 What Hare has in mind here is
Kant’s argument that the highest good requires us to postulate the existence
of God. Because we are creatures of need we unavoidably seek our own
happiness. Morality commands us to pursue the highest good, in which
happiness is proportioned to virtue. But “we cannot adopt this end as an
intended consequence without believing it possible; and we cannot believe
it possible without assuming “a higher, moral, most holy, and omnipotent
being who alone can unite the two elements of this good.” This requires us
to believe not merely in the possibility but the actual existence of God.”42
Hare, “Kant on Recognizing our Duties,” 469. See also Hare God’s Call, 109–114.
Kant, Religion, 6:3.
41
Hare, God and Morality, 163.
42
Hare, God and Morality, 165.
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This reply, however, does not solve the problem about obedience to
God. Let us grant that, for Kant, the pursuit of the highest good requires
us to believe in the existence of God. This yields belief in God conceived
as the guarantor of the highest good. But conceiving of God this way is
not the same as conceiving of God as a superior who issues commands
that we must obey. This is true even if we suppose that God wills the
highest good, and that God wills for us to pursue the highest good. It
is one thing to think, “I must pursue the highest good, and the highest
good is only possible if God exists, and in pursuing the highest good I am
doing what God wills me to do and taking up the same end as God.” It is
another thing to think, “I must pursue the highest good (or fulfill any of
my duties) because God commands me to do so.” Obedience requires the
second attitude, not merely the first. And even if Kant’s argument from
the highest good shows that we must adopt the first attitude, it does not
show that we must adopt the second attitude. Nor does it reveal how the
second attitude is consistent with Kant’s claims about the independence
of morality from God. So even if qua dependent beings we do need “the
idea of a being over us,” this is not the idea of God as a superior who
issues authoritative commands that must be obeyed. This is not a being
“over us” in the same sense that departmental authority is over the student
or the political authority is over the citizen—i.e., it is not the idea of God
as a practical authority. Furthermore, the idea of God as the guarantor
of the highest good does nothing to answer the question: Why is even
autonomous obedience to God appropriate, if it is actually pure practical
reason, rather than God, that “gives (to the the human being) a universal
law which we call the moral law”?
And so the problems generated by the Obedience Assumption remain.
If regarding duties as divine commands is the same as obeying God’s commands, then the characteristic attitude of the Kantian religious person is
incompatible with Kant’s own claims about the independence of morality
from God.
4. From Duty and In Hope
Let us take stock. Kant claims that we should regard our moral duties as
divine commands. Our question is: what we are supposed to be doing
when we regard our duties this way? The most natural answer is that we
are taking God as an authority whom we should obey, analogous to practical authorities like parents, teachers, or political rulers. But features of
obedience show that this attitude is inconsistent with Kant’s central claims
about morality. And thus the overall outlook of the Kantian religious person looks inconsistent. Furthermore, whatever insights we might glean
from the nuanced interpretations of Wood and Hare, they are not sufficient to solve this problem.
Given the difficulties that arise from the Obedience Assumption, it
seems reasonable to attempt an interpretation of Kant’s religious person that abandons this assumption. In this section, I develop such an
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interpretation. Let us start with a passage from the second section of
Groundwork, where Kant says this about commands:
The representation of an objective principle, insofar as it is necessitating for
a will, is called a command (of reason) [Gebot (der Vernunft)], and the formula
of the command is called an imperative. All imperatives are expressed by
an ought and indicate by this the relation of an objective law of reason to a
will that by its subjective constitution is not necessarily determined by it (a
necessitation).43

A few pages later, Kant says that “commands are laws that must be
obeyed, that is, must be followed even against inclination.”44 In short, a
practical law presents an action as practically necessary—as good, or to be
done—and the concept of a moral law includes the idea of absolute practical necessity, as applying to all beings regardless of their inclination or
purposes.45 What the concept of command adds to the concept of law is
the idea of necessitation, an action’s being practically necessary in the face
of inclinations that may not align with the law.46 As Kant says:
[I]f reason solely by itself does not adequately determine the will; if the
will is exposed also to subjective conditions (certain incentives) that are not
always in accord with the objective ones; in a word, if the will is not in itself
completely in conformity with reason (as is actually the case with human
beings), then actions that are cognized as objectively necessary are subjectively contingent, and the determination of such a will in conformity with
objective laws is necessitation.47

Unlike human beings, God does not have contingent needs and subjective
inclinations. Thus God is not subject to commands or imperatives. But this
does not mean that the divine will is lawless. Rather, the divine will necessarily accords with the moral law, and hence the notion of necessitation
is out of place:
A perfectly good will would, therefore, equally stand under objective laws
(of the good), but it could not on this account be represented as necessitated to
actions in conformity with law since of itself, by its subjective constitution,
it can be determined only through the representation of the good. Hence
no imperatives hold for the divine will and in general for a holy will: the
Kant, Groundwork, 4:413.
Kant, Groundwork, 4:416.
45
In the preface to the Groundwork, Kant cites one of the Ten Commandments to illustrate
the absolute necessity of moral laws: “Everyone must grant that a law, if it is to hold morally,
that is, as a ground of an obligation, must carry with it absolute necessity; that, for example, the
command ‘thou shalt not lie’ does not hold only for human beings, as if other rational beings
did not have to heed it, and so with all other moral laws properly so called” (4:389). Given
that the Ten Commandments are a paradigm case—probably the paradigm case – of divine
commands, it is noteworthy that Kant does not mention God or the divine will in this passage.
46
Although an imperative is the formula of a command, and there are hypothetical
imperatives, Kant prefers to reserve the term command for a categorical imperative. See
Groundwork 4:416.
47
Kant, Groundwork, 4:412–413.
43
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“ought” is out of place here, because volition is of itself necessarily in accord
with the law.48

Kant reiterates this point in the Critique of Practical Reason, where he says
that the “supremely self-sufficient intelligence” is properly represented as
“incapable of any maxim that could not at the same time be objectively a
law.”49 That is why the divine will is holy.
A striking feature of Kant’s definition of a command is that it does not
include any mention of an authority who issues commands. A command
is an objective principle with necessitation, and it seems that a command
per se does not require someone who commands. In this respect, Kant’s
abstract notion of command differs from the kind of ordinary commands
given by sergeants, teachers, or other practical authorities. For in those
cases, a command implies a superior who commands.50
However, even if the general concept of a command does not require
a commander, it seems that a divine command must have a commander.
What else could a divine command be, if not a command issued by God?
Kant surely recognizes this. Perhaps that is why, when discussing the recognition of duties as divine commands, Kant is quick to distinguish commands from sanctions (Sanktionen), which also imply a commander:
In this way the moral law leads through the concept of the highest good,
as the object and final end of pure practical reason, to religion, that is, to the
recognition of all duties as divine commands, not as sanctions—that is, chosen and
in themselves contingent ordinances of another’s will—but as essential laws of
every free will in itself, which must nevertheless be regarded as commands
of the supreme being because only from a will that is morally perfect (holy
and beneficent) and at the same time all-powerful, and so through harmony
with this will, can we hope to attain the highest good, which the moral law
makes it our duty to take as the object of our endeavors.51

Unlike the abstract concept of a command, the concept of a sanction does
imply a commander from whose will the ordinance (verordnung) proceeds.
And that might suggest that divine commands, which proceed from the
divine will, are actually sanctions. But Kant emphatically denies this,
Kant, Groundwork, 4:414.
Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:32.
50
We sometimes speak about something other than a person issuing a command—e.g.
“The posted sign commands us not to go beyond this fence.” But there is no puzzle here.
The sign is not really the commander but a statement of the command. The commander is
whoever put up the sign as a directive to would-be fence crossers.
51
Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:129. In this passage, Kant appears to be defining sanctions (Sanktionen) as “chosen and in themselves contingent ordinances of another’s will.”
This is an odd way of defining sanctions, which are typically understood not as ordinances
themselves but as the penalities that attend the violation of an ordinance. Perhaps, then,
Kant’s real intention is not to offer a definition of sanctions, but to point out a type of ordinance that is accompanied by sanctions. Or perhaps “sanctions” is not really the best translation of Sanktionen in this passage. In any case, these issues do not undermine the substance
of my proposed interpretation of the Kantian religious attitude. Thanks to Mark Murphy for
encouraging me to think about this issue.
48
49
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because sanctions are chosen and in themselves contingent (sich selbst
zufällige), whereas moral duties are not. Rather moral duties are “essential
laws of every free will in itself”—a truth that would be lost if we thought
of moral duties as divine sanctions.
I take it that a sergeant ordering a private to dig a ditch would be an
example of an ordinance that is chosen and contingent. The sergeant
decides to give the order, and he could have ordered otherwise—e.g., he
might have ordered the private to clean the latrine, instead, and in that
case it would have been latrine-cleaning, rather than ditch-digging, that
was the action to be done. Kant wants to be clear that regarding our duties
as divine commands does not mean thinking of them like that. At the same
time, the idea of a divine command, unlike the most general and abstract
concept of a command, does imply the will of another. In particular, it
implies a will that is morally perfect and all-powerful. So in thinking of
our duties as divine commands we are to be thinking of them as both: (1)
directives related to the will of another, and in that respect similar to ordinary commands, and (2) necessary and essential laws of every free will in
itself, and for that reason not mere contingent ordiances but commands
that possess unconditional, objective, and universal validity.
In connection to this, consider the passage from Religion quoted above
in section three. There Kant argues that an ethical community is conceivable only as a people under divine commands. But even so the laws of
an ethical community cannot be thought of as “proceeding originally
[ursprünglich ausgehend] merely from the will of this superior (as statutes
[Statute] that would not be binding without his prior sanction [Befehl])
for then they would not be ethical laws, and the duty commensurate to
them would not be free virtue but an enforceable legal duty.” The sergeant’s order seems to be an example of a command that proceeds originally merely from the will of a superior. The sergeant could have chosen
to command differently, and had the sergeant not commanded the private
to dig the ditch, then the private would not have had an obligation to do
so. Moreover, the private’s obligation is an enforceable duty. So in saying
that moral duties do not proceed originally merely from the will of God,
Kant again seems to be aware that regarding duties as divine commands
requires some appeal to the divine will. But again he stresses that the
divine will is not to be conceived like the will of the sergeant who orders
the private to dig a ditch.
We saw earlier that Kant conceives of the divine will as holy, as necessarily operating morally perfectly. It would be wrong, however, to think
that we first form a conception of the divine will, and we then think of that
will as holy. Rather what comes first is our concept of a necessarily morally perfect will, and our notion of divinity is taken from that. Thus there
can be no divergence between what we affirm as divinely willed and what
we affirm as in accordance with the moral law. In this respect, the divine
will is clearly different from any particular human authority. To illustrate:
given that killing one’s own son is in violation of the moral law, we can
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be absolutely certain, in advance of any other information, that God did
not will a father to kill his son. The same cannot be said for any human
authority.52
All of this suggests a way of understanding what it means to conceive
of one’s moral duties as divine commands. The dutiful Kantian religious
person acts morally out of respect for the moral law. At the same time, she
recognizes that the moral law is the necessary principle of the divine will.
She thereby expands her overall understanding of morality to include the
idea of an omnipotent and perfectly-lawful will that is capable of bringing
about the highest good.53 This rational idea of the divine will combines
(a) our conceptually prior understanding of moral perfection with (b) the
notion of a cause sufficient to bring about the highest good, which morality commands. As Kant says: “[T]he concept of the Divinity actually originates solely from the consciousness of these [purely moral] laws and from
reason’s need to assume a power capable of procuring for them the full
effect possible in this world in conformity with the moral final end.”54 To
think of one’s duties as divine commands is to think of them in light of the
fact that the moral law—which is a formal principle that pure practical reason gives to itself—is also the necessary principle of the divine will, which
is a cause capable of bringing morality to fruition in the highest good.
However, to think of the moral law this way is not to think of the moral
law as having a normative grounding in God’s practical authority over us.
Nor is it to fulfill one’s moral duties because God commands them. In that
sense, the Kantian religious person does not act from obedience to God
per se. Rather she acts from respect for the moral law, with the awareness
that the law is also the necessary principle of the divine will. And thus we
can describe her motivational structure this way: She acts both from duty
and in hope—a hope for attaining the highest good, which she grasps as
warranted because of her awareness that the very moral law for which she
has respect is also the necessary principle of an all-powerful will.
This interpretation of the Kantian religious person faces a textual
challenge that needs to be addressed. In at least one passage, Kant specifically refers to obedience to God: “Since all religion consists in this,
that in our duties we look upon God to be honored universally, the
determination of religion, so far as the conformity of our conduct with
it is concerned, comes down to knowing how God wills to be honored
(and obeyed).”55 This suggests that, after all, the attitude of the Kantian
religious person acts from obedience. But this appearance is misleading.
Religion 6:87. Kant is alluding, of course, to Abraham and Isaac.
“But now, if the strictest observance of the moral laws is to be thought of as the cause of
ushering in the highest good (as end), then, since human capacity does not suffice to effect
happiness in the world proportionate to the worthiness to be happy, an omnipotent moral
being must be assumed as ruler of the world, under whose care this would come about, i.e.,
morality inevitably leads to religion” (Religion 6:8).
54
Kant, Religion, 6:104.
55
Kant, Religion, 6:103–104.
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In the paragraph that follows this sentence, Kant distinguishes between
merely statutory and purely moral laws. He is clear that so far as there
is a way to honor God that is universally valid for humans as such, this
honoring concerns only “pure moral legislation, through which God’s
will is originally engraved in our hearts.”56 And earlier in the same section, Kant makes the following criticism of those who follow a religion
of divine service:
They cannot indeed conceive their obligation except as directed to some service or other which they must perform for God – wherein what matters is
not the intrinsic worth of their actions as much as, rather, that they are performed for God to please him through passive obedience, however morally
indifferent the actions might be in themselves. It does not enter their heads
that, whenever they fulfill their duties toward human beings (themselves
and others), by that fact they also conform to God’s commands; hence, that
in all their doings and non-doings, so far as these have reference to morality,
they are constantly in the service of God.57

What is noteworthy about this passage is that when Kant speaks about
the true service of God, which involves moral not statutory laws, he does
not distinguish between: (a) obedience to divine commands, and (b) doing
what fulfills the content of a divine command. Or rather: Kant says that
what matters for genuine service to God is not obedience per se but fulfilling the content of the command—“conforming” to the command by
doing one’s moral duty. This suggests that when Kant uses the language
obedience to God in the following paragraph, what he has in mind is not
obedience to God strictly speaking—i.e., he is not thinking of persons who
fulfill their duties because God commands them and from respect for
God’s practical authority.
With all this in mind, let us return to the earlier suggestion that the
Kantian religious person is analogous to the private who has more than
one decisive reason to dig the ditch—both because it will prevent a
flood, and because he has been commanded to do so. We can now see
why this is a misleading analogy. In the case of the private, there are
two types of normative consideration involved: one relates to a good
result that is to be brought about (preventing a flood), and the other
is based in the sergeant’s practical authority. Moreover, the sergeant’s
authoritative command is not the same thing as the fact that digging
the ditch is a good idea because it will prevent a flood. But matters are
different with the moral law and the divine will. Divine commands are
not a different type of normative consideration, added to the normativity of the moral law. Nor are there are two different things that can
be thought of separately, as if the moral law were one thing and the
divine will another. Rather, when the Kantian religious person is led
from morality to religion, she comes to see that the moral law is the
56
57

Kant, Religion, 6:104. Kant’s language here is an echo of Romans 2:15.
Kant, Religion, 6:103.
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necessary principle of the will of a being who is omniscient, omnipotent, holy, and just.58
5. No Divine Commands After All?
If recognizing duties as divine commands does not involve acting out
of obedience to God, then it is much easier to reconcile the attitude of
the Kantian religious person with Kant’s other claims about morality.
However, we face a different problem. If the Kantian religious person
does not act out of obedience to God, then it seems she is merely thinking
of her duties as being in harmony with God’s will, rather than as divine
commands. Earlier we noted that even if you do something in the knowledge that you are doing what God wills you to do, this is not the same as
obedience; it is not doing it because God wills you to do it. We now face the
same point viewed from the other end. If you do not act from obedience,
then even if you act in the knowledge that what you are doing is what God
wills you to do, you are not treating the divine will as a source of authoritative commands. You are simply seeing your will as being in harmony
with the divine will.59
In response to this worry, we might point out that, in fulfilling her
duties, the Kantian religious person does not see her will as being merely
in harmony with the divine will. It is not as if her will is one thing, and
the divine will is another, and the two happen to coincide. For she also
thinks of that divine will as a cause capable of bringing about the highest
good, happiness in proportion to virtue. And she aims to attain the highest good. So the Kantian religious person sees herself as dependent upon
the divine will for achieving her aim (an aim required by morality), and
she hopes for the proper proportioning of happiness and virtue that only
the divine will can achieve.
That said, I think a defender of Kantian religion should concede that
when we speak about regarding duties as divine commands, we are
speaking loosely. We are using a notion of command that is crucially different from the type of command issued by authorities such as sergeants,
parents, or political rulers. For once we understand the role that God plays
in Kantian religion, we see that God is not functioning like a practical
authority of the familiar sort. Nor does the central attitude of the Kantian
58
“Now the human being as a secure foundation on which he can build his faith in
God . . . He tries to act according to the duties he finds grounded in his own nature; but he
also has senses which present the opposite to him with a blinding bedazzlement, and if he
had no further incentives and powers to resist it, then he would in the end be blinded by
their dazzle. Hence in order that he may not act against his own powers, he is set by his own
reason to think of a being whose will is those very commands which he recognzies to be given by
themselves a priori with apodictic certainty” (Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion
28:102: first emphasis added).
59
Cf. Wood, “Religion, Ethical Community, and Evil,” 501: “Second, although we may
hope to attain the highest good only if our will is in harmony with God’s will, it has not yet
been explained why we should think of this harmony specifically as our obedience to commands issued by God’s will.”
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religious person involve obedience to God in the ordinary sense of obedience. And thus the relevant idea of command must be quite different from
ordinary commands. Indeed, it is so different that one might reasonably
think it is misleading for Kant to speak about divine commands, rather
than harmony with, and dependence upon, the divine will.
Interpreted this way, Kant turns out to be less of a divine command theorist than some of his passages suggest—and less a divine command theorist than scholars like Hare have argued. However, this interpretation does
not make God any less important for Kantian morality, or turn Kant into
a more “secular” philosopher.60 Moreover, it has the benefit of allowing us
to describe the characteristic attitude of the Kantian religious person—to
say what she thinks about moral duties and God—in a way that avoids
inconsistencies with Kant’s other claims about morality. The alternative, it
seems to me, is to grant that Kantian religion really is incoherent.61
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